Trends in the Use of Extrinsic Aids in Statutory Interpretation by Fisher, Glendon M., Jr. & Harbison, William J.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 3 




Trends in the Use of Extrinsic Aids in Statutory Interpretation 
Glendon M. Fisher Jr. 
William J. Harbison 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Glendon M. Fisher Jr. and William J. Harbison, Trends in the Use of Extrinsic Aids in Statutory 
Interpretation, 3 Vanderbilt Law Review 586 (1950) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol3/iss3/34 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more 
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
NOTES
TRENDS IN THE USE OF EXTRINSIC AIDS
IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
I. INTRODUCTION
As evidenced by the increasing numbers of court decisions which involve
statutes,' and by the large and continually growing literature in the field,
2
the subject of statutory interpretation is one of the most important in modern
law. Although it is a field in which exact rules of automatic application can
very seldom be formulated, only recently a member of the Supreme Court
pointed out the great need for a set of "consistently accepted principles of
interpretation." 3 Since the primary purpose of all statutory interpretation
is to ascertain the meaning and to effectuate the purposes of the legislature,
4
and since words are merely symbols without inherent meaning, every statute
upon which a court is required to rule must, in some sense, be construed and
interpreted.
5
Among the many problems of statutory interpretation, one of the most
important and also, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has pointed out, one of the
most troublesome is "the determination of the extent to which extraneous
documentation and external circumstances may be allowed to infiltrate the
text on the theory that they were part of it, written in ink and discernible
to the judicial eye." 6
1. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COL. L. REV.
527 (1947); Johnstone, The Use of Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Intcrpretation in Oreqon
29 ORE. L. REv. 1 n.1 (1949) ; Meyer, Legislative History and Maryland Statutory Con.-
struction, 6 MD. L. REv. 311 (1942).
2. Sanders and Wade, Legal Writings on Statutory Construction, 3 VAND. L. REv.
569 (1950).
3. Jackson, The M £eaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court Says,
34 A.B.A.J. 535, 536 (1948), also in 8 F.R.D. 121 (1948).
4. See Woodroof v. Nashville, 183 Tenn. 483, 489, 192 S.W.2d 1013, 1015 (1946);
see generally 50 Am.JuR., Statutes § 223 (1944) ; CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUcTiON
§ 158 (1940) ; 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4501 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
5. See de Sloov~re, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. Or PA.
L. REV. 527, 552-54 (1940) ; Nutting, The Relevance of Legislative Intention Established
by Extrinsic Evidence, 20 B.U. L. Rv. 601, 606 (1940). At times a technical distinction
has been drawn between the "interpretation" and the "construction" of a statute, the
former being the discovery of meaning from the words of the statute themselves, while
the latter consists of drawing conclusions with respect to subjects not always included
in the direct expressions in the text. See Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. T. 599, 19 Pac. 135,
138 (1888); CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRucTIoN § 157 (1940). This distinction is
largely ignored in actual practice, however. See United States v. Keitel, 211 U.S. 370,
385-87, 29 Sup. Ct. 123, 53 L. Ed. 230 (1908). The two terms are used interchangeably
in this Note for that reason.
6. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COL. L. REV.
527, 529 (1947). Although the term "extrinsic aids" is frequently used to refer primarily
to the pre-enactment history of statutes, in a broad sense it includes all materials other
than the actual statute which may be used by the courts in interpretation. For the types
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There has been much dispute among legal writers as to the value of
extrinsic aids to statutory interpretation and as to the propriety of their use.
On the one hand, it has been urged that legislative intention is a mirage,
being either nonexistent or incapable of ascertainment if it does exist ;7 there-
fore the use of extrinsic aids to search for it is fruitless. On the other hand,
it has been contended that even if a particular meaning was not in the legis-
lative mind when a statute was enacted, nevertheless it is possible to ascertain
the underlying purposes of a statute, and any material which is relevant to
that determination should be utilized.8 Perhaps the majority of writers share
the opinion of Professor de Sloov~re that the ultimate question is not whether
"legislative intention" in any of its senses is determinable at all, but whether
extrinsic aids, such as the legislative history of a statute, "are relevant and
helpful in applying the statute'in particular cases." 9
Although the writers have not been able to agree, most of the American
courts have not been greatly troubled over the existence or discoverability
of legislative intention. 0 While they probably use extrinsic aids for the pur-
pose stated by de Sloov~re, they invariably assert that they resort to such
materials in order to determine the "intention of the legislature," which they
agree must control the interpretation of statutes."
Like all other judicial processes, the use of extrinsic aids by the courts
can be, and undoubtedly has frequently been, abused. The courts have drawn
considerable criticism for their lack of consistency in the use of extrinsic
aids ;12 for using extrinsic materials which were irrelevant in order to reach
results felt to be desirable by the deciding court ;13 and for resorting to broad
exclusionary rules when relevant aids were available and might have led to
a decision opposite to the one reached.
14
Nevertheless, there are few judges or legal writers in America today
of materials which may be used as "extrinsic aids" see CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TIxON §§ 209-26 (1940).
7. Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. Rxv. 863 (1930); Radin, A Short
Way With Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388 (1942).
8. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARv. L. Rav. 886 (1930).
9. de Sloov~re, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. oF PA. L. REv.
527, 529 (1940) ; Horack, Cooperative Action for Imeproved Statutory Interpretation, 3
VAND. L. REv. 382 (1950); Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IOWA L. REv.
737, 740-41 (1940).
10. See Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REv. 509
(1940).
11. For illustrative cases, see Note, 70 A.L.R. 5 (1931) ; see generally 2 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CoNSmRUcTION § 4501 (3d ed., Horack, 1943). See also materials note 4, supra.
12. Jones, The Plain Meaning Ride and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2 (1939); Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous
Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REv. 509 (1940).
13. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407, 411 (1950)
Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court Says, 34
A.B.A.J. 535, 538 (1948).
14. Perhaps the leading case illustrating this practice is Caminetti v. United States,
242 U.S. 470, 37 Sup. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442 (1917) ; see Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule
and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2 (1939);
Legis., 50 HARv. L. REV. 822 (1937).
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who would advocate the adoption in this country of the English practice of
disregarding, or using only sparingly, extrinsic aids to statutory interpreta-
tion.1 5 Most of those who criticize the American practice do not deny the
value of extrinsic aids in proper cases and simply call for the abandonment
of flat rules of exclusion,16 the use of frank and clear language by the courts,7
and the exercise of careful and objective choice in admitting and weighing
extrinsic materials.'
8
II. EXTRINsic AIDS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The pattern for the use of extrinsic aids in statutory interpretation in
the United States has largely been set by the federal rather than by the state
courts. The history of their use in the federal.courts has been discussed many
times,19 and it need be noted only briefly here. In general that history has
been marked by an ever expanding use of extrinsic aids, both in the numbers
of cases in which particular aids have been employed and in the varieties and
types of materials which have been utilized. Thus while the reports of con-
gressional committees have long been recognized by federal courts as legiti-
mate aids to statutory interpretation, 20 they have been employed with
increasing frequency in recent years.21 And while formerly resort to legis-
lative debates and the opinions of individual legislators was not permitted in
construing a statute,22 exceptions were early carved out in the case of speeches
15. For discussions of the English practice, see MdAXWELL, THE INTERPRETATION OF
STATUTES 29 (9th ed., Jackson, 1946); Davies, The Interpretation of Statutes in the
Light of Their Policy by English Courts, 35 COL. L. REv. 519 (1937) ; Note, 55 L.Q. REV.
488 (1939). Not even Professor Radin would be willing to carry exclusionary rules to
the extent of the English practice. Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV.
388, 410 (1942).
16. de Sloov~re, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. or PA. L.
REv. 527, 553 (1940) ; Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J.
335 (1949).
17. Horack, Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory Interpretation, 3 VAND. L.
REv. 382 (1950); Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L. Rix.
509 (1940).
18. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COL. L. REv. 527,
543 (1947). See articles note 16 supra.
19. Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IOwA L. REv. 737 (1940) ; Jones,
The Plain. Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes.
25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2 (1939); Nutting, The Relevance of Legislative Intention Established
by Extrinsic Evidence, 20 B.U.L. REv. 601, 606 (1940). At times a technical distinction
of Federal Statutes, 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 158 (1925); Notes, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 326
(1937), 5 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 235 (1937).
20. 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 5005 et seq. (3d ed., Horack, 1943);
Chamberlain, The Courts and Committee Reports, 1 U. OF CHI. L. Rxv. 81 (1933);
Frankham, Some Comments Concerning the Use of Legislative Debates and Committee
Reports in Statutory Interpretation, 2 BROOKLYN L. REV. 173 (1933). See also articles
note 19 supra.
21. Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IOWA L. REV. 737, 745 (1940),
For a collection of Supreme Court cases in which the legislative history of a statute, par-
ticularly as shown in committee reports, was resorted to, see the dissenting opinion of
Justice Frankfurter in Comm'r v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 687, 69 Sup. Ct. 337
(1949).
22. CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 213 (1940); 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CoNsmuCTIox § 5011 (3d ed., Horack, 1943). Individual opinions have been said to be
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or answers to questions from the floor by committee chairmen and committee
members.23 Later even the opinions of individual members of Congress, ex-
pressed in debate, were permitted to be considered by the courts in deter-
mining the general purposes of statutes and the evils sought to be remedied
by their enactment. 24 In few cases have the individual opinions of congressmen
as to the meaning of the words of a statute been held admissible, whether
such opinions were expressed in debate or in testimony before the courts.
25
Several writers upon the subject, however, have urged that such opinions
should be admitted, although the weight to be given them should depend
upon the authority with which the legislator spoke and upon his relation to
the passage of the statute.2 6 Indicative of a possible trend toward the use of
such materials is a recent federal case27 which has gone so far as to admit
the affidavits of a congressman and the counsel for an administrative agency
as to their understanding of the intention of Congress in enacting a statute.
While the case has drawn criticism,2 8 and perhaps justly so, and while it
has gone further than any previous'case in using such materials, it illustrates
the liberal attitude prevailing in the federal courts as to the use of any
extrinsic material which may be helpful in applying a statute to a given
case.
29
of little value in ascertaining the intention of the legislature as a whole, because "[t]hose
who did not speak may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke might
differ from each other...." United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S.
290, 318, 17 Sup. Ct. 540, 41 L. Ed. 1007 (1897).
23. See Chamberlain, The Courts and Committee Reports, 1 U. oF CI. L. REv. 81,
85-6 (1933) ; Frankham, Some Comments Concerning the Use of Legislative Debates
and Conmittee Reports in Statutory Interpretation, 2 BROOKLYN L. REV. 173 (1933).
See materials cited note 19 supra.
24. See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625, 55 Sup. Ct. 869,
79 L. Ed. 1611 (1935) ; Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U.S. 1, 20, 25 Sup. Ct. 158,
49 L. Ed. 363 (1904) ; 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNsmucnoN § 5011 (3d ed., Horack,
1943).
25. See note 22 supra; 2 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 24, at § 5013. Aost authori-
ties agree, however, that the rule permitting the use of legislative debates to ascertain
the purposes of a statute has the effect of making such materials available for use
generally, since it is almost impossible to draw a line between use for determining
purpose and use to ascertain meaning. Frankham, Some Comments Concerning the Use
of Legislative Debates and Committee Reports in Statutory In terpretation, 2 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 173, 177 (1933) ; Note, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 326 (1937) ; Legis., 50 HARV. L. REv.
822, 824 (1937).
26. CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CoxsmucTioNv § 213 (1940); Note, [1940] Wis. L. REV.
453, 457; Legis., 50 HARv. L. REv. 822, 824 (1937).
27. United States v. Howell Electric Motors Co., 78 F. Supp. 627, 630 (E.D. Mich.
1948), afo'd, 172 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1949).
28. 97 U. oF PA. L. REv. 293 (1948).
29. The freedom with which the federal courts have resorted to the use of extrinsic
materials has probably tended to encourage an abuse in the legislative process itself;
namely, the "manufacturing" of "legislative history" for statutes. This process consists
of the making of detailed records of committee hearings, debates, etc., in which are set
forth the "interpretations" by individual congressmen upon a proposed statute. When
preserved in the records of hearings, these deliberately inserted statements may easily be
takep by a court as evidence of the "intention" of Congress in enacting the measure,
when actually they were never subjected to the test of a vote by the members of Congress
at all. See Cox, Sone Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L.
RFV. 1, 44 (1947).
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Very recently, however, there has been some indication that in the future
the use of extrinsic aids in the federal courts may be curbed, or at least
that it may encounter opposition. Two members of the Supreme Court have
given warning that the practice of using them, particularly the use of legis-
lative history of statutes, has been "badly overdone." 39 In an address before
the American Bar Association, Mr. Justice Jackson indicated that the
temptations afforded by the free use of extrinsic aids and the abuses that
such use has led to, are such that he is tempted to favor the English practice
of excluding legislative history almost entirely.3' His thesis was that the
legislature has the burden of communicating its purposes in the language
of statutes, and if it does not successfully do so, then the court has neither
the right nor the duty to see what the legislature meant to do or should have
done. He warned that some phase of the legislative history of a statute can
usually be discovered to support any desired interpretation of the statute,
and he pointed with alarm to the fact that an attorney can no longer rely
upon the wording of a duly enacted statute unless he has available its entire
legislative history.
Somewhat similar, although perhaps more modified, views were ex-
pressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a recent address. 32 He urged the full
use of all relevant extrinsic aids to determine the purpose of the legislature
as evidenced by the statutory language, but he warned against their use in
order to effectuate the subjective views of the judge or to carry out a
purpose which the judge may think Congress should have had in mind in
enacting the statute. Although he would not be willing to accept the English
view, he would always make the language of the statute the principal guide
to interpretation and then resort to other aids, giving them weight according
to the circumstances of each case.
Despite these words of caution from two members of the highest Court,
no appreciable trend has been apparent in the federal cases in the direction
of a more conservative use of extrinsic aids.3 3 In joining with Justice Black
in his dissenting opinion in the recent case of United States v. Alpers,1
4
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter adhered to their views that the language
of the statute must be the controlling guide in ascertaining the purposes of
the legislature, 35 but nothing in the majority or the dissenting opinions in
30. Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court
Says, 34 A.B.A.J. 535, 537 (1948).
31. Id. at 538.
32. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COL. L. REv. 527
(1947).
33. Certainly if the attitude of the court in United States v. Howell Electric Motors
Co., supra note 27, is indicative of that of the federal courts generally, as it seems to be,
extrinsic materials will in the future be used even more freely than in the past.
34. 70 Sup. Ct. 352 (1950), reversing 175 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1949).
35. The statute involved was one which made it an offense to ship in interstate
commerce any "obscene . . . book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, letter,
writing, print, or other matter of indecent character." 41 STAT. 1060 (1920), 18 U.S.C.A.
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that case shows any tendency on the part of the Court to reject relevant
extrinsic materials. And in the recent Standard Oil case,3 6 Justice Frank-
furter made free use of the legislative history of the statute involved in
writing the opinion of the majority of the Court.
III. EXTRINSIC AIDS IN THE STATE COURTS
While in general the greatest development in the use of extrinsic aids
to statutory interpretation has been on the federal level with state courts
following the patterns there set, this result has by no means been due to the
fact that state courts are any less troubled with problems of interpretation
than are the federal courts. The same problems exist at all levels, and while
the proportion of cases in which state courts are compelled to deal with
statutes still may be somewhat smaller than in the federal system, certainly
as statutes and regulations continue to multiply, the instances in which the
state courts will have to deal with them will increase.
3 7
Undoubtedly the reason for the greater use of extrinsic materials at
the federal level lies in the fact that such materials are fat more readily
available to the federal courts than to the state courts. Few states have avail-
able any publications to compare with the Congressional Record and the
Federal Register to collect and preserve legislative materials and adminis-
trative rulings.38 The carefully preserved committee reports and records of
hearings before committees in the federal system make available to the
federal courts rich sources from which may be drawn valuable materials
bearing upon the meaning and purposes of federal statutes.
In contrast with the situation in the Federal Government is that to be
found in the average state, where almost no legislatively-created extrinsic
aids are available to assist the courts in interpreting statutes. As Professor
Horack has pointed out, "The real problem today is the production, not
the use, of extrinsic materials. Except for Congress and four or five state
legislatures, legislative bodies have failed to provide administrators or courts
with materials other than the statutes themselves." 39 For the general con-
fusion in the language of the state court opinions and for the lack of predict-
ability in the manner in which state courts will interpret statutes, Professor
§ 396 (1927), now 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1948). The majority of the Court held that obscene
phonograph records were included in the statute, but the dissenting justices felt that if
Congress had intended for records to be included, it should have expressly so provided.
36. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 69 Sup. Ct. 1051 (1949), 3
VAND. L. REv. 156.
37. See Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 335, 341
(1949).
38. See Bradley, Legislative Recording in the United States, 29 Ams. POL. Scr. REv.
74 (1935) ; Johnstone, The Use of Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Construction in Oregon,
29 ORE. L. REv. 1, 10 (1949) ; Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IoWA L.
REv. 737 (1940).
39. Horack, Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory Interpretation, 3 VAND.
L. REV. 382, 387 (1950).
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Horack places the responsibility primarily upon the state legislatures and
their failure to provide efficient drafting services to make statutory language
clear, and to make available adequate legislative records to which attorneys
and judges may resort in construing statutes.40
It is apparent from the many cases in the state reports that the state
courts are no more hesitant than the federal courts to make full use of such
extrinsic materials as are available to them. 41 Thus nearly all state courts
are willing to use such materials relating to the history of a statute as they
have at their disposal; for example, the history of the period when a statute
was enacted has frequently been referred to in order to ascertain the purpose
of the statute.4 2 Similarly resort has been made to the general public policy
of the state and the established policy of the legislature.43 The state courts
have generally shown the same reluctance as that shown by the federal courts
to admit the testimony and opinions of individual legislators, 44 although they
do sometimes utilize the testimony, oral and written, of code commissioners
and revisers.
45
It is with reference to the actual history of the enactment of statutes
that extrinsic aids are lacking in most states, and these are the types of
materials which are most valuable in determining what the legislature really
intended. Only Pennsylvania makes an adequate report of legislative de-
bates, 46 and in most states the only record of legislative activity which is kept
consists of the journals of the respective houses, which in many states are
required by constitutional provisions. 47 The Tennessee journals are typical
40. Id. at 387; for the utility of legislative materials to the practicing attorney, see
MacDonald, The Position of Statutory Construction in Present Day Law Practice,
3 VAND. L. REv. 369 (1950).
41. For a collection of cases, see Note, 70 A.L.R. 5 (1931). Concerning the use
of extrinsic aids in particular states, see Johnstone, The Use of Extrinsic Aids to
Statutory Construction in Oregon, 29 ORE. L. REv. 1 (1949) ; Meyer, Legislative History
and Maryland Statutory Construction, 6 MD. L. Rsv. 311 (1942); Notes, 35 IowA L.
REv. 88 (1949), 36 Ky. L.J. 190 (1948), [1940] Wis. L. REv. 453.
42. E.g., Kelly v. Dewey, 111 Conn. 280, 149 At. 840 (1930)'; State v. Kelly, 71
Kan. 811, 81 Pac. 450 (1905); Hubbard v. Haynes, 225 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn. 1949),
3 VAND. L. REv. 666 (1950) ; Trotter v. State, 158 Tenn. 264, 12 S.W.2d 951 (1929) ;
State v. Nashville Baseball Ass'n, 141 Tenn. 456, 211 S.W. 357, 4 A.L.R. 368 (1919):
CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 210 (1940).
43. E.g., Woodroof v. Nashville, 183 Tenn. 483, 192 S.W.2d 1013 (1946); Franklin
Light & Power Co. v. Southern Cities Power Co., 164 Tenn. 171, 47 S.W.2d 86 (1932):
Hunter v. Harrison, 154 Tenn. 590, 288 S.W. 355 (1926) ; CRAWFRD, STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 212 (1940).
44. See generally 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONsTRUCTIo N § 5011 (3d ed.,
Horack, 1943). But cf. People ex rel. Fleming v. Dalton, 155 N.Y. 175, 52 N.E. 1113,
1116 (1899). A number of state courts have resorted to the use of debates of state
constitutional conventions, and several writers have seen in this an indication that
state courts would utilize legislative debates and the opinions of legislators if these
materials were available to them. See Johnstone, The Use of Extrinsic Aids to Statntory
Construction in Oregon, 29 ORE. L. REv. 1, 7 (1949) ; Notes, 36 Ky. L.J. 190, 198
(1948), [1940] Wis. L. REv. 453, 457.
45. E.g., Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Meek. 294 Kv. 122. 171 S.9.d 41
(1943); 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5008 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
46. See Bradley, Legislative Recording in the United States, 29 Am. PoL. Zc.
REv. 74 (1935).
47. "Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time
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of those kept in most states; they contain the record of votes upon the
measures before the houses, 4 8 short, formal committee "reports," 49 messages
of the chief executive, and full reprints of proposed amendments to bills&0
As to the actual proceedings before committees, debates upon the floor of
the legislature, and full committee reports there are no records at all in
Tennessee. Newspaper accounts furnish almost the only written source of
information as to what occurred during the legislative session.51
Thus at the state level where draftsmanship of statutes has been poorest
and consequently where extrinsic aids are most needed, 52 such aids have been
sorely inadequate. 53 There is at the present time some tendency among the
states to provide better facilities for the drafting of statutes and to provide
legislative reference services to members of the legislature.54 That these and
publish the same ... " TENN. CoNsT. Art. 1, § 5. See Note, 35 IOWA L. REV. 88, 92
(1949).
48. The entries for the passage of each bill are almost identical and are usually
very uninformative. A typical entry in the Tennessee journals is as follows: "House
Bill No. 415-To regulate elections in the City of La Follette.
"The bill passed its third and final reading by the following vote:
Ayes 69
Noes 0"
Then follows a list of representatives voting on the measure. TENN. H.R.J. 491 (1943).
49. A typical Tennessee committee "report" is as follows:
"MR. SPEAxER: Your Committee on Education and Common Schools beg leave to
report that we have carefully considered and recommended Senate Bill No. 113, with
Committee Amendments, for passage. LYoN-, Chairman"
TENN. SEN. J. 246 (1941).
50. As to the weight and usefulness of journal records of amendments in the inter-
pretation of statutes, see Legis., 50 HARV. L. REv. 822, 824 (1937) ; Notes, 36 Ky. L.J.
190, 195 (1948), [1940] Wis. L. REv. 453, 459.
51. This is true in most of the states, although in some there are publications
sponsored by private enterprise which attempt to furnish some record of the activity
of legislatures. Such an unofficial service exists in Tennessee, but it would be of very
little use as an extrinsic aid to interpretation. It consists merely of a daily list of
measures introduced in each house, the names of the sponsors of the bills, and the
action of each house on the bills.
52. Horack, Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory Interpretation, 3 VAND.
L. REV. 382, 387 (1950) ; Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IowA L. REV.
737, 738 (1940).
53. Although of little value to the courts in determining legislative meaning and
purpose, the state" legislative journals are, of course, frequently resorted to in order to
determine whether a statute was enacted according to the required procedure. See e.g.,
Fuqua v. Davidson County, 227 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. 1950) ; State e.x rel. Pitts v. Nashville
Baseball Club, 127 Tenn. 292, 154 S.W. 1151 (1913) ; Trading-Stamp Co. v. Memphis,
101 Tenn. 181, 47 S.W. 136 (1898). See Note, 36 Ky. L.J. 190, 196 (1948).
54. For example, in 1949 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute pro-
viding for a legislative drafting and reference bureau. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, c. 192.
The statute provides for a bureau of three members who are to conduct surveys upon
request, collect and preserve data useful to legislators, advise and assist in the drafting
of statutes, and index the statutory and other material available to legislators in the
state libraries. Apparently no appropriation has been made for the bureau, so that it
has not yet begun to function actively. A similar and more active service was recently
set up in Oregon. Johnstone, The Use of Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Construction in
Oregon, 29 ORE. L. REv. 1 (1949). For discusssion of similar agencies and the types
of services which they render, see READ AND MAcDONALD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 283-86 (1948); OUR STATE LEGISLATURES 12-15 (Rev. ed. 1948) (Report




similar services when well financed and organized are of real aid to legis-
latures and that their records furnish valuable sources for courts and attorneys
to use in determining the meaning of statutes has been proved in New York,
where several agencies concerned with the drafting and proposing of statutes
have been created.55 As yet, however, there seems to be little tendency at
the state level to follow the lead of Pennsylvania and the Federal Government
in providing complete records of committee hearings, committee reports and
legislative debates. Until these materials are made available, the state courts
will continue to be handicapped in their attempts to interpret statutes by the
use of legislative history. 56
With reference to other types of extrinsic aids than the history of the
enactment of statutes, the state courts have generally been as willing as the
federal courts to make use of relevant materials. Thus evidence of adminis-
trative and executive interpretation of statutes ;57 statutes in pari ntateria;58
interpretations of other states upon statutes borrowed from those states ;19
and many other types of extrinsic materials60 have been freely employed
by the state courts.
Of course in the states as well as in the federal courts, the so-called
"plain meaning" rule is still observed to some extent, and it presents at
least a theoretical obstacle to the use of extrinsic aids in all cases.6' Because
there are no definite standards as to when the rule will be applied or ignored,62
and because of an exception to it by which courts may render the rule almost
meaningless,63 generalizations as to its use are difficult. The rule has been
55. See MacDonald, The Position of Statutory Construction in Present Day Law
Practice, 3 VAxD. L. REv. 369 (1950) for an account of the operation of the New
York Law Revision Commission and other New York agencies.
56. Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 I,D. L.J. 335, 348
(1949).
57. E.g., Collins v. McCanless, 179 Tenn. 656, 169 S.W.2d 850, 145 A.L.R. 1380
(1943) (interpretation by tax authorities); Knoxtown Theatres, Inc. v. McCanless,
177 Tenn. 497, 151 S.W2d 164 (1941) (construction by state legal department);
Cummings v. Sharp, 173 Tenn. 637, 122 S.W.2d 423 (1938) (civil service and pension
board construction); Sanford Realty Co. v. Knoxville, 172 Tenn. 125, 110 S.W.2d 325
(1937) (tax authorities). See Note, [1940] Wis. L. REV. 435, 461.
58. First National Bank v. Howard, 148 Tenn. 188, 253 S.W. 961 (1923); Kelly
& Co. v. State, 123 Tenn. 516, 132 S.W. 193 (1910) ; 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY C0N-
STRUCTiON §§ 5201-05 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
59. E.g., State ex rel. Williams v. Jones, 179 Tenn. 206, 164 S.W.2d 823 (1942);
Gazzola v. Kimball, 156 Tenn. 229, 299 S.W. 1039 (1927); Smith v. Dayton Coal &
Iron Co., 115 Tenn. 543, 93 S.W. 62, 4 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1180 (1905).
60. E.g., Shields v. Williams, 159 Tenn. 349, 19 S.W.2d 261 (1929) (construction
placed on statute by legal profession). See generally Note, 70 A.L.R. 5 (1931) ; CRAW-
FORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 209 e seq. (1940).
61. The plain meaning rule is simply a rule of construction under which the courts
will not look beyond the words of a statute if the statute is "clear and unambiguous"
on its face. See generally 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 4701-06 (3d ed.,
Horack, 1943); Note, 5 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 235, 236 (1937).
62. Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2 (1939) ; Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unanu-
biguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REv. 509 (1940).
63. The exception is that if the literal construction of a statute will lead to an
"absurd" or "unreasonable" result, then extrinsic materials will be utilized in order to
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widely and sharply criticized,6 4 but it still represents a device to which the
courts may resort when they do not desire to consider extrinsic aids, 65 or
when they are not persuaded by such materials as may have been presented
to them.66 It is probably safe to say that at the federal level, and probably
to an increasing extent at the state level, the rule in all its former vigor
67
will seldom be applied,6 8 but very modern reiterations of it are still to be
found.69 Thus in Ex parte Collett,70 the Supreme Court stated that the rule
was applicable, but it applied the rule only after it had considered the legis-
lative history of the statute involved and found it unconvincing.
A practical problem in the use of extrinsic materials is the selection
of the proper method of presenting them to the courts. Probably most ex-
trinsic materials relate to matters of which the courts will take judicial
notice. 71 Some authorities recommend that they be proved as evidence at the
trial level, 72 although this method has the disadvantage of bringing into
play the technical rules of evidence. A great many attorneys simply incor-
porate extrinsic materials into their briefs, 73 but this procedure, while
probably the most simple, has the disadvantage that the court is not compelled
to examine materials which are not part of the record. Whatever method is
ascertain the true intention of the legislature. See Johnstone, The Use of Extrinsic
Aids to Statutory Interpretation in Oregon, 29 ORE. L. REv. 1 (1949); Jones, supra
note 62, at 19.
64. de Sloovare, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 527, 528, 531 (1940); Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24
IND. L.J. 335 (1949) ; Legis., 50 HARV. L. REV. 822, 823 (1937) ; Note, 35 IowA L. REv.
88, 89 (1949). See also note 62 supra.
65. Jones, supra note 62, at 18; Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43
HARv. L. RE%,. 886, 890 (1930).
66. Legis., 50 HARv. L. REv. 822, 823-24 (1937); Note, [1940] Wis. L. REV. 453,
454.
67. E.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166- U.S. 290, 17 Sup. Ct.
540, 41 L. Ed. 1007 (1897); Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 20 Sup. Ct. 155, 44
L. Ed. 219 (1899) ; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 37 Sup. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed.
442 (1917); United States v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 278 U.S. 269, 49 Sup. Ct. 133, 73
L. Ed. 322 (1929) ; Matson Nav. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 352, 52 Sup. Ct. 162,
76 L. Ed. 336 (1932).
68. Probably the modern attitude upon the subject is illustrated by the statement
of Reed, J., that, "When aid to construction of the meaning of words is available, there
certainly is no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear
on 'superficial examination.'" United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S.
534, 544, 60 Sup. Ct. 1059, 84 L. Ed. 1345 (1940). In United States v. Dickerson, 310
U.S. 554, 60 Sup. Ct. 1034, 84 L. Ed. 1356 (1940), in reply to an argument that the
statute in question was plain and unambiguous in meaning, Murphy, J., wrote: "It
would be anomalous to close our minds to persuasive evidence of intention on the ground
that reasonable men could not differ as to the meaning of the words. . .The meaning-
to be ascribed to an Act of Congress can only be derived from a considered weighing
of every relevant aid to construction." 310 U.S. at 562. See Boston Sand and Gravel
Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48, 49 Sup. Ct. 52, 73 L. Ed. 170 (1928).
69. E.g., Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260, 65 Sup. Ct. 605, 89 L. Ed. 921
(1945).
70. 337 U.S. 55, 61, 69 Sup. Ct. 944 (1949).
71. See de Sloovare, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 527, 550 (1940).
72. READ AND MAcDONALD, CASES AND 'MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, 1174-76 (1948).
73. Ibid. See Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 360, 66 Sup. Ct. 637,
90 L. Ed. 718 (1946) for a recent instance of a court's making use of extrinsic materials
in the briefs of counsel.
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selected as most appropriate for the individual case, there can be no doubt
but that skillful presentation of extrinsic materials has been and will con-
tinue to be an important factor in persuading courts to make free use of them.
IV. CONCLUSION
From this brief survey of the present status of the use of extrinsic
materials in statutory interpretation, it appears that the practice is generally
accepted by the courts upon a broad scale. Although there are criticisms of
the practice from some quarters and although few general rules may be
formulated as to when resort to particular types of aids will be made, the
tendency at the present time seems to be toward expanding rather than
restricting the use of such materials.
At the state level, where the most valuable types of extrinsic aids are
still generally lacking, all indications from previous decisions and from the
states which do have such aids are that the state courts are willing to make
full use of all types of relevant materials which may be presented for their
consideration. At both the state and federal levels there is a definite trend
toward the more clear and careful drafting of statutes. If the "plain-meaning
rule" were consistently followed, then resort to extrinsic aids to interpretation
would be reduced to the extent that greater numbers of "clear and unambigu-
ous" statutes are enacted in the future. In view of the great criticism of that
rule, however, and in view of the general willingness of courts to avoid it,
it may very well be that in the future even apparently "clear and unambiguous"
statutes will be interpreted in the light of extrinsic materials.
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